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STATEMENT OF THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County, 
State of Utah. The Defendant- Appellant, Laura Miller was charged in a Criminal Information 
with three counts of violations of the Utah Controlled Substances Act and this is a direct appeal 
from a final order and verdict entered by a jury of guilty as to all three charges. 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is based upon Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellant 
Procedure which governs appeals of criminal cases and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW AND CITATION TO THE RECORD 
ISSUE 1) Did the District Court err in failing to strike the paragraphs containing 
information from the confidential informant from the Affidavit in support of the search warrant 
because of admitted errors, misstatements, and material omissions which require suppression of 
evidence seized under the warrant under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether misstatements or omissions in the 
affidavit in support of search warrant as to probable cause is mixed question of law and fact 
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subject to de novo review. United States vs. Mc Ouisten 795 F.2d 858 (9th Cir 1986); and, State 
vs, Lee. 863 P.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1993). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT: A Motion to Suppress was filed on October 1, 1993 and can be found in the record 
at page ten of the record. A pretrial hearing was held on February 4, 19945 see pages 1 to 72 of 
the transcript 
ISSUE 2) Did the Trial Court commit an error in denying the Motion to Suppress 
because of the failure to support the hearsay assertions of the confidential informant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether misstatements or omission on the 
affidavit in support of search warrant as to probable cause is mixed question of law and fact 
subject to de novo review. United States vs. Mc Ouisten 795 F.2d 858 (9th Cir 1986). State vs. 
Lee. 863 P.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1993). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT: A Motion to Suppress was filed on October 1, 1993 and can be found in the record 
at page ten of the record. A pretrial hearing was held on February 4, 1994, see pages 1 to 72 of 
the transcript. 
ISSUE 3) Should the court have granted the mistrial Motion based upon the 
prosecutors possession during jury deliberations of a key exhibit? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue is an issue of law and no difference should be given to 
the decision below. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT: The Motion for New Trial, the discussion on the record and the ruling are found in 
the transcript pages 232 to 238. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he 
right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated....". 
2. Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
3. Rule 17(k) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the 
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have 
been received as evidence, except deposition; and each juror may 
also take with him any notes of the testimony or other proceedings 
taken by himself, but none taken by any other person. 
4. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
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(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own 
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of a party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case in which the Defendant/Appellant was charged in an Information 
with Unlawfully Producing a Controlled Substances a Third Degree Felony on October 1, 1993, 
in Count II with Possession of Controlled Substances a Class B Misdemeanor, and in Count HI 
with Possession of Drug Paraphernalia a Class B Misdemeanor. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT 
A Hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress was held on February 4, 1994, 
preceding a trial on April 26, 1994, in Monticello, Utah. The case was tried by a jury and on 
April 26, 1994, the jury found the Defendant, Laura Ruth Miller, guilty of Unlawfully Producing a 
Controlled Substances and guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substances and guilty of 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The Court entered a Judgment and Order of Probation 
sentencing the Defendant to probation on June 2, 1994. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The District Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and the matter was set for 
Jury Trial. After a one day jury trial, the Defendant-Appellant was found guilty on all three 
Counts. Subsequent to final judgment, this appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. At the Motion to Suppress hearing held on February 2, 1994, William Pierce, a 
Deputy of the San Juan County Sheriffs Department, testified that he was the affiant on a Search 
Warrant which was executed on property located in San Juan County, State of Utah where one 
live marijuana plant was found. (Transcript of February 4, 1994, hearing and April 26, 1994, Tr. 
7.) 
2. Deputy Pierce indicated that his investigation commenced upon the receipt of 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 which was a handwritten letter from a person by the name of Hans 
Guhr. (Tr. pg 8). 
3. The handwritten note which was received as Exhibit 
1 which initiation the investigation is set forth in the Addendum as Exhibit 3. 
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4. The officer indicated that prior to obtaining the search warrant, he never met 
personally with Hans Guhr and that all of his contacts were over the telephone on one or two 
occasions. (Tr. pg 11). 
5. The deputy indicated that the person that wrote the letter had given his name but 
that he listed the person as a confidential informant on the Affidavit in support of the warrant 
because Mr. Guhr told the officer "he wanted to stay out it". (Tr. pg 14). 
6. In relation to the statement in the Affidavit the deputy indicated that he had known 
Hans Guhr "for two years" and that he had first met Hans Guhr in January, 1993, only 9 to 10 
months prior to the issuance of the Affidavit. (Tr. pg 18). 
7. Deputy Pierce indicated that in January, 1993 that he had hired Hans Guhr to work 
as a caretaker and security guard and paid him in cash and not by check. (Tr. pg 18). 
8. The deputy indicated that when he hired Hans Guhr as a security guard that he did 
not perform a background or security check on Mr. Guhr. (Tr. pg 21). 
9. Deputy Pierce indicated that he had testified at a prior Preliminary Hearing that 
Hans Guhr gave him a Social Security Number. (Tr pg 22). Mr. Guhr stated that all he had was 
a Canadian Social Security number which he gave to Mr. Pierce. (Tr. 119) 
10. Deputy Pierce indicated that Hans Guhr told him at sometime that he was a 
Canadian citizen and that he later learned, prior to issuance of the warrant, that Mr. Guhr was a 
Canadian citizen. (Tr. pg 27). 
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11. Deputy Pierce indicated that after the time that he had left the deputy's 
employment at the Rio Alga Mine as a security guard, he came in contact with Mr. Hans Guhr in 
relation to a driving under the influence investigation involving a fried of Mr. Guhr. (Tr. pg 28). 
12. Prior to the issuance of the Affidavit in this case, Deputy Pierce indicated that 
Hans Guhr had never given him any prior information as a confidential informant in relation to any 
prior investigation. (Tr.30). 
13. Exhibit Nine was received into evidence which is a publication from a local 
newspaper indicating that the public being offered a reward for information in relation to 
controlled substance cases (Tr. pg 32). 
14. Deputy Pierce indicated that prior to the execution of the warrant, he went to the 
property which was subject to the search and contacted Laura Miller on two occasions. (Tr. pg 
37). On one of those occasions, the Defendant identified herself as Laura Miller and the officer 
thought that this was the person that he was investigating in the letter. (Tr. 39). At the time of 
that meeting, Laura Miller told the officer about problems she had at the property with the former 
resident, Hans Guhr.(Tr. 40) 
15. At the time of the affidavit of the warrant, the deputy knew that his informant had 
lived at the trailer in the summer just several weeks prior to the letter. (Tr. 41) Laura Miller 
complained to the Deputy that Mr. Guhr left as caretaker and had not returned a pickup truck that 
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belong to Steve Schultz, the owner of the property, and Laura Miller was living as a caretaker 
because of problems with Mr. Guhr. (Tr. 41). 
16. Prior to signing the affidavit a resident of Monticello with a good reputation for 
truth and honesty by the name of Mary Hutnick had told the Deputy that Mr. Guhr had caused her 
to leave the Steve Schultz residence as a caretaker and she had told the deputy that Mr. Guhr was 
a liar.(Tr 57) Also, Mary Hutnick had reported to the officer that Hans Guhr was looking in her 
window and that she was concerned about this behavior by Mr. Guhr.(Tr. 59) 
17. Sherry Miller testified that Mr. Guhr stayed at her residence after he had left the 
Steve Schultz property. She testified that Mr. Guhr usually drank Vodka in the morning for 
breakfast and that he consumed alcohol on a daily basis. (Tr. 64) After Laura Miller was arrested, 
she testified that Mr. Guhr was bragging in public and said MI got Laura. She's in jail" (Tr. 66). 
18. Sherry Miller also testified prior to the arrest of Laura Miller, that Hans Guhr had 
told Sherry Miller that he was going to set her up. (Tr. 68) 
19. Mr. Guhr admitted that he was emotionally upset at Laura Miller when he turned 
her in by means of the letter.(Tr. 113) He admitted that when he first saw the marijuana that he 
was also living on the property and he was daily watering a tree in the same area that the 
marijuana plant was discovered. (Tr. 116 and 143) He admitted that he lived on the property 
alone before Laura Miller came in June of 1993.(Tr. 147) 
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20. Mr. Guhr stated that he took the pictures of the marijuana plants while he was 
living on the property so that he could "protect himself1 from Laura Miller "bad mouthing me" 
(Tr. 128) He said that he released the photographs because Laura Miller made statements that 
upset him.(Tr. 129) 
21. Concerning Exhibit One, the letter written by Mr. Guhr to the police, and the 
allegation that Laura Miller was supposedly planting marijuana in the La Sal Mountains, the 
witness stated that he had never saw Laura Miller give the plants to anyone. (Tr. 140) 
22. During closing argument, counsel for the Defendant made specific reference to 
Statefs Exhibit One, the letter that Hans Guhr mailed to the San Juan Count Sheriffs Department. 
The transcript indicates that counsel for the Defendant stated as follows: 
[Mr. Gaither, Attorney for the Defendant]... And one of the keys, and Ifm going to go to that right 
off, was he said, well, as far as the production charge is concerned, they didn't need Mr. Guhr, 
that he just gave some information to the police and that the police just acted on his information. 
Now let's just analysis that and see what information he gave the police. 
If I could approach the bench, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. GAITHER: ...Let's look again at Exhibit 1. Now Mr. Guhr, he doesn't sign 
it. You don't see his name on here. It says confidential on it, although he says he wanted people 
to know he was giving this information. What does he do? He gives false information. We've 
proven it false. I mean he even admitted it was false. When he got on the stand, let's look at one 
of the good examples. If you go back, you recall he says, Well, yes, there was this lady who 
brought her over some marijuana, about two pounds, brought her two pounds of marijuana... 
He had no problem in writing this letter to the police to state that she also cultivated 
approximately 250 to 300 seeds in plants, but when he's on the stand yesterday he didn't say 
9 
anything about that He said there was a egg carton with a few plants that she was planting and 
he wasn't sure that they were marijuana, could have been marijuana but he writes to the police. 
This gives us false information. So when the police get the information they're getting 
information that is false information. When they go out there they've got a mind set thinking that 
there's this, Mr. Guhr has said all these things about Laura Miller... 
When I cross examined him he just said it didn't happen. But he's willing to come 
in and state under oath that this happened, this was a matter of fact and he writes it in this 
letter. 
What else does he say in the letter? Oh, these are the two men who supplied her 
with marijuana all summer. He says, although he's saying there's cultivation going on, he's saying 
that these two men are supplying her with marijuana in his letter... 
He says he reports this on Sunday, September 19th, to a deputy and that nothing 
happens and so now he's going to write a letter... 
23. Exhibit One, the letter referred to by Counsel for the Defendant, was never 
submitted to the Jury because the Prosecutor took the received exhibit out of the Courtroom in 
his file. (Tr.233). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Affiant submitted to the issuing judge an affidavit with false and incomplete 
information which mischaracterized the source of information and the reliability of the Mr. Hans 
Guhr, the person listed as the confidential informant, and that information was the basis for the 
issuance of the warrant. 
2. The Affidavit on its face is insufficient under Utah law even without striking out 
the information from the confidential informant to state probable cause. 
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3. The Motion to Suppress should have been granted and the lower court should be 
reversed and a judgement of suppression entered in favor of the Defendant and against the State 
as requested by the Defendant-Appellant. 
4. During Closing Argument, the Defendant submitted that Exhibit One, the letter 
from Hans Guhr set forth in the addendum, was a key because of the exaggerations and 
misstatements made by the State's key witness. 
5. The Motion for Mistrial made by the Defendant should have been granted because 
the prosecutor took out of the courtroom and kept in his file during deliberations Exhibit One. 
6. The Appellant submits that the Order denying the motion for mistrial should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO STRIKE THE INFORMATION 
FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT ROM THE AFFIDAVIT 
SUBMITTED TO OBTAIN THE SEARCH WARRANT AND IN DENYING 
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE 
The Appellant presented to the trial court evidence that the affidavit and application for 
the search warrant signed by Deputy William Pearce of the San Juan County Sheriffs Office 
contained misrepresentations and omissions material to probable cause when submitted to the 
issuing judge. The nature of the erroneous information required the lower court to enter a 
finding that those errors were made either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
The Appellant submits the Court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress because the information 
should have been stricken from the application from the warrant. 
In Franks vs. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154 (1978) the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
a search warrant can be challenged based upon misstatements in the search warrant when 
the misstatements are recklessly made or knowingly false information. That information must be 
deleted under Franks in reviewing the sufficiency of the affidavit. If the statements are necessary 
to a finding of probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits thereof 
suppressed from use at trial. 
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In State vs. Brown. 798 P 2d 284 (Utah 1990) the Utah Courts followed the Franks 
decision as to the procedure in relation to the knowing or reckless inclusion of information which 
shows a disregard for the truth, including false and misleading information. The Court of Appeals 
cited the case of Franks vs. Delaware, Supra, where the United States Supreme Court held that 
if a Defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant made a false statement, 
intentionally, knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, the false material must be set 
to one side and probable cause determined by the Affidavit's remaining content. 
An affidavit supporting a search warrant which contains erroneous statements or 
misstatements of material facts without sufficient independent accurate statements to support 
issuance of a warrant should be suppressed. United States vs. Page. 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir 
1980). In United States vs. Richardson. 861 F.2d 291 (US. APP D.C. 1988), the Court stated: 
Police officers must take care to include all evidence of probable 
cause available to them in their affidavit must accurately reflect 
the facts of the particular case. 
The test to determine whether any misrepresentation or false statement contained in an 
affidavit is material to establishment of probable cause should be objectively determined as to 
whether the warrant would have been issued if the magistrate had been given accurate 
information. United States vs. Page. 808 F.2d 723, cert. den. 482 U.S. 918 (10th Cir. 1987). In 
Page, the Tenth Circuit Court indicated non intentional errors material to the establishment of 
probable cause also call for suppression if the errors are material. 
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Under the "totality of the circumstances" standard, a magistrate issuing a warrant must 
first make a practical, common sense decision as to whether there is a fair probability that 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Where the affidavit involves hearsay 
conclusion of an expert, a magistrate would not have a "substantial basis for concluding]" 
that probable cause existed if the expert conclusions were in error. Illinois vs. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983), citing Jones vs. United States. 362 US 257 (1960). The validity of a search warrant 
must be assessed on the basis of information that the agents had actually disclosed or had a duty 
to disclose to the issuing magistrate. Maryland vs. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987). 
The Defendant submits that the affidavit submitted by the San Juan County Sheriffs 
deputy contained admitted errors, such as the statement in the Affidavit that he had known Hans 
Guhr "for two years." (See Exhibit 4 in Addendum). At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, 
the deputy indicated that he had actually first met Hans Guhr in January 1993, only nine to 10 
months prior to the issuance of the Affidavit. (Tr. pg 18). Mr. Guhr was not a reliable confidential 
informant involved in prior investigations. Prior to the issuance of the Affidavit in this case, 
Deputy Pierce indicated that Hans Guhr had never given him any prior information as a 
confidential informant in relation to any investigation. The Appellant at the hearing demonstrated 
that the deputy acted with at least reckless disregard for the truth and omitted and failed to submit 
the known fact that the "confidential informant" was a prior resident with an ongoing feud with 
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the other suspect. The deputy knew that Hans Guhr had lived at the residence when the plant was 
growing and had an opportunity to plant and cultivate the marijuana. 
The Utah Supreme Court has extended the reasoning in Franks to include misstatements 
which occur because information is omitted. State vs. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). Under 
Nielsen, a Defendant must establish by a preponderance of evidence that material information has 
been intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly omitted and that with the omitted information 
inserted, the Affidavit does not support probable cause. The Tenth Circuit Court has stated that 
recklessness may be inferred where the omitted information is "clearly critical" to the 
determination of probable cause. DeLoach vs. Bevers. 922 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1990). 
The affiant should never have described Mr. Guhr as a confidential informant because he 
had signed a letter to initiate the investigation and submitted the letter through the public mail. By 
describing to Mr. Guhr as a confidential informant the affiant was able to characterize the 
situation as a police initiated investigation instead of an inquiry started by a fight between 
caretakers of the property. This is clearly critical information which was not included in the 
application to obtain the search warrant. 
Further, at the trial when the State finally produced the "confidential informant" as a 
witness, Mr. Guhr admitted that he was emotionally upset at Laura Miller when he turned her in 
by means of the letter.(Tr. 113) Mr. Guhr took the pictures of the marijuana plants while he was 
living on the property so that he could "protect himself1 from Laura Miller "bad mouthing me" 
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(Tr. 128) He said that he released to photographs because Laura Miller made statements that 
upset him to a third party. (Tr. 129) 
The Deputy had met with Laura Miller prior to the execution of the affidavit and she 
described the problems with Mr. Guhr which placed the Deputy on notice of Mr. Guhr's 
motivation in writing the letter. The material information which was either in error or omitted 
from the affidavit can be classified as follows: 
1) The fact of no prior use by the police of the "confidential 
informant" of Mr. Guhr and that he was acting for private motives and not under 
the supervision of law enforcement officials. (Tr.30) 
2) The fact that the affiant had not known Mr. Guhr for "two years" 
and he did not have any substantial basis to personally vouch for his honesty 
and truthfulness of the Canadian citizen in light of his knowledge of other 
problems. (Tr.18) 
3) The fact that Mr. Guhr should have been a suspect of law 
enforcement because the Deputy knew he had resided on the property during times 
when the marijuana plant would have been maturing and acted as a caretaker at the 
property. (Tr.37) 
4) The fact that Laura Miller, a suspect due to Mr. Guhr's letter (see 
Exhibit one), had reported to the Deputy that Mr. Guhr was wrongfully in 
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possession of a motor vehicle of the owner of the property and had a motive to 
fabricate evidence because of problems between her and Mr. Guhr which caused 
him to leave the property. (Tr.41). 
5) The lack of personal observation of the plant which was described 
as being close to the front fence along the public road in front of the property. 
6) The fact that Mr. Guhr did not have a social security number which 
should have been disclosed during the prior employment of Mr. Guhr by the 
Deputy Sheriff 
7) The report to the Deputy by the previous caretaker of the property, 
Mary Ann Hutnick of improper and suspicious behavior of Hans Guhr and her 
report that Mr. guhr was a "liar". (Tr.57). 
If the omitted information had been inserted into the affidavit, no reasonable magistrate 
"would have issued the search warrant based on the sketchy information provided by a person with 
a motive to give false information. In light of the fact that the "confidential informant" was the 
sole source of the information, evidence of the true nature and motivation of the source of the 
information would discredit the information. The Appellant sustained the burden of presenting 
evidence known to the Deputy which was disregarded in his brief investigation. The focus of the 
investigation should have been on Mr. Guhr, instead of two or three telephone calls to the 
"confidential informant. Therefore, the lower court should be reversed. 
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POINT n 
DOES THE WARRANT ON ITS FACE SUFFICIENTLY 
CORROBORATE THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S TESTIMONY 
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE WARRANT 
UNDER BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION? 
In State vs. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the requirements a warrant must 
contain on it's face concerning independent verification of information from confidential 
informant. The Court indicated the following the case of Illinois vs. Gates. 462 U.S., 213 (1983), 
the warrant must establish a tight web of circumstantial evidence supporting the reliability of the 
allegations of the confidential informant. The Court indicated that depending on the 
circumstances, a showing of the basis of knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person 
providing the information for a warrant may well be necessary to establish that, with a fair 
probability, evidence sought actually exists and can be found where the informant claims. 
In State vs. Lee, 863 P.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court applied the Court applied the 
totality-of-the circumstance's analysis in analyzing probable cause under Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Sate Constitution. The affidavit in Lee was sufficient to establish probable cause because 
the omitted information about the reliability of the informant was not material in light of 
corroboration of the informant's statements by other information. 
In State vs. Singleton. 214 Utah Ad. Rep 30 (1993) the Court of Appeals stated as 
follows: 
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Utah courts, however, have used the Aguilar-Spinelli factors as 
guides in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test. "[A]n 
informant's 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are but two 
relevant considerations, among other, in determining the existence 
of probable cause under 'a totality-of-the circumstances.'" Hansen, 
732 P.2d at 130 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32,235-36, 103 S. 
Ct. at 2328-31). See also State vs. Puruse. 828 P.2d 515-517. 
(Utah App. 1992). The Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines are not applied 
as "strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly exacted' in every 
case. A weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so 
long as in the totality there is substantial basis to find probable 
cause." Hansen. 732 P.2d at 130 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 
103 S. Ct. at 2332). 
In an analysis of the Search Warrant used to obtain the search warrant by the San Juan 
County Sheriffs Department indicates that the officer made misrepresentations concerning the 
important factor of corroboration of the confidential informant as set forth in Point I of the Brief. 
The evidence received at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress indicated that the affiant to the 
search warrant failed to disclose relevant and important information concerning the unreliability of 
the informant. Unlike the affidavit in State vs. Lee, supra, the statements of the informant were 
not corroborated by any significant independent information. 
The Appellant submits that the lower court should find that the affidavit is not sufficient 
on it's face to support the issuance of a search warrant. Because the failure to support the 
hearsay allegations of the confidential informant the affidavit fails, even if the allegations attacked 
above in Point One of this brief are not stricken from the affidavit. 
In State vs. Brown. 798 P 2d 284 (Utah 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals in relation to 
search warrants issued on hearsay information noted that the Courts view the testimony of citizen 
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informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police informers, citing State vs. 
Treadway, 499 P. 2d, 846 (Utah, 1972). The Court stated that in cases not involving citizen 
informants that the two-pronged test of Aguilarvs. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) which requires 
circumstances which establish the basis of knowledge of the informant and the informant's 
veracity or reliability should be considered in determining whether there is probable cause for the 
Warrant. 
The affidavit in support of the warrant does not contain the quantity or quality of 
information necessary to support the hearsay assertions from the unnamed source. The Affidavit 
in this case consists of four brief paragraphs of relevant information. The information concerning 
the confidential informant is a bald assertion that the confidential informant is a reliable and 
truthful individual and states no factual basis for liability of the source or the information. Even if 
the Court does not strike the information from the confidential informant, the Affidavit fails to 
meet the requirements of State vs. Lee and State vs. Brown and requires that the Court should 
have granted the Motion to Suppress. 
POINT m 
SHOULD THE COURT HAVE GRANTED THE MISTRIAL MOTION 
BASED UPON THE PROSECUTORS POSSESSION DURING JURY 
DELIBERATIONS OF A KEY EXHIBIT? 
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After the arguments of Counsel, the Court instructed the jury as follows concerning the 
exhibits and their deliberations. 
THE COURT: Alright, members of the jury, go with the bailiff He will take you into the 
jury room. He will bring the exhibits in later. I think the clerk will also be in to bring you a menu 
so you can order lunch. Lunch is on the house. 
Let's get that door shut. (Tr. 226) 
The Court clearly intended to submit to the jury all of the exhibits and neither party nor 
the court limited all of the exhibits from being submitted to the jury. Rule 17(k) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of 
the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received as evidence, except 
deposition; and each juror may also take with him any notes of the testimony or 
other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any other person. 
However, after the jury had returned and entered the verdict, the prosecutor brought to 
the Court's attention the fact that he had taken an important State's Exhibit One out of the 
Courtroom with him in his file and kept the exhibit during the deliberations. 
The record reflects as follows: 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, I have a matter that I need to indicate. As I made my closing 
arguments I had this letter. It was placed on the desk. I put it in my stuff. It didn't go in the jury 
room. It's Exhibit 1. I think that's what the motion, I just as the jury was coming in showed it to 
Mr. Gaither. So I want the Court to know that's— 
MR. GAITHER: Yes, Your Honor, at this time the Defendant would move the Court for 
a mistrial. The prosecutor, he did show me before the jury came back in. In fact, he had, I'm sure 
by inadvertence he had taken an exhibit that did not go into the jury which is Exhibit 1. I would 
point out that that was a key exhibit to the defense. I referred to that exhibit specifically. 
I asked the jury to read that exhibit. There was no other document that said that. As far as I was 
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concerned in my closing argument, if my closing argument is reviewed that was the central 
basis to the defense is that Hans Guhr had started out making false statements and that he was 
suspect in the case and the information that he gave to the police was false and they did not have 
it and this is an exhibit that was not in the jury room and I believe that there's no way that the 
Court can find that that is not prejudicial. It's important to the defense. I understand it was 
inadvertence on the part of the prosecutor. I'm not saying he took it intentionally but on the other 
hand it's fundamental that all exhibits go into the jury and that they have all the exhibits before 
them, that they consider all of the exhibits. So I would move the Court for a mistrial setting aside 
the jury verdict. 
THE COURT: Mr. Halls? 
MR. HALLS: I appreciate Mr. Gaither's indication that he believe that that was 
inadvertent which it was. Your Honor, I think if there's an issue here, if there is any difficulty here 
it was not central to the jury's determination of what the verdict would have been whether they 
had that or didn't have it. It was adequately argued by all parties. It was to the jury in a couple of 
different ways by Mr. Gaither and parts of it by myself. If there is any error in that I believe it's 
harmless error and if he wants to argue that to the Court of Appeals I believe that's the 
appropriate for that to be done. I don't think that on that basis that the thing should be a mistrial. 
THE COURT: Mr. Halls, when did you notice that you had that exhibit? 
MR. HALLS: As I walked in here and sat down. 
THE COURT: Why did neither one of you mention this to me before I asked for the jury 
verdict. I could have sent that in with them and said you didn't have the exhibits. Here, here's an 
additional exhibit. We won't take your verdict. You consider whether that affects your verdict 
and then come back in. Why didn't either of you ask me to do that? This is something that 
could easily have been corrected simply by sending the jury back out with that exhibit and there 
would have been no question. I would not take their verdict from them until they had considered 
whether that would make a difference. 
MR. GAITHER: Again, in response, this gets to the basis of a jury trial. They are 
supposed to have all of the exhibits and all of the evidence and, again, this was key. This was the 
document that I said you need to take a look at. Please read and deliberate on this. And it wasn't 
in there before the jury. So they did not have all of the exhibits and I think that we would move 
the Court for a mistrial. 
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THE COURT: All right. I find that the Defendant has not raised this in timely fashion. 
She knew about it, admittedly shortly before the verdict was received but she knew about it in 
time that this could have been raised in time to correct it by sending the jury back before the 
verdict was received. 
MR. GAITHER: This was done as the jury was walking in and— 
MR. HALLS: No, it was done before the bailiff went out. Your Honor, I walked in and 
sat down here. I opened up my file and there was the document and I pulled it out and I said, 
"Oops." He shook his head and said, Oh. And it was before the Judge came in. In fact, it was 
before you walked in the room. 
MR. GAITHER: I don't believe that the Defendant or myself has an obligation to, this 
isn't a mistake that, I mean I didn't have the exhibit. Mr. Halls knew he had the exhibit. As the 
Court has indicated he could have said something to the Court. He didn't say anything to the 
Court. As far as I'm concerned it was a mistrial at the time it went in there at the time of 
deliberation. It would have been error, after they have reached a verdict to send that back in. I 
was representing my client to the best of my abilities. I did not know of any requirement that 
said that I had to point out the fact that the prosecutor has an exhibit there to the Court. My 
client should not be held, I don't think that the Court can find a waiver in this situation based on 
those facts and circumstances. 
THE COURT: I do find that the Defendant was aware but before the jury was brought 
into the courtroom and certainly before the Court received the verdict and had it read. Certainly 
not before the jury had indicated that they had reached a decision. But I can send them back 
before they have announced the decision and any fact, even afterwards I can send them back 
saying, wait a minute, I think there is something here that is a problem. I think I could send them 
back even then to reconsider their verdict in the light of additional information. 
And even if that were not the case, it's my judgment that having listened to the evidence 
during the trial and the arguments of the parties that the contents of Exhibit 1 were adequately 
and repeatedly described to the jury and that there was really no dispute about what Exhibit 1 
said. And therefore, I certainly would have preferred to have the jury have it there in the event 
they wanted to look at it but they did not ask where it was which indicated they did not, at least I 
think it's reasonable to believe that they did not consider it a disputed question what Exhibit 1 
said. It was something that had admittedly been argued, certainly been argued by the defendant 
extensively but that meant that the jury was very much aware of that exhibit and so I don't find 
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that there is prejudice to the Defendant in the fact that Exhibit 1 was not given to the jury to 
review. So the motion for mistrial is denied. (Tr. 236 to 238) 
In State vs. Buckley, 546 A.2d 799 (VT. 1988) a defendant convicted after a jury trial 
argued that the Court erred in failing to supply to the jury during the jury's deliberation an exhibit 
which had been introduced into evidence. The Court in Vermont indicated that by oversight one 
of the exhibits had not been avaiabile to the jury and it was not clear from the record whether the 
omission was the fault of the Court or of counsel. Noting that in the usual course of events, the 
exhibits would have gone to the jury absent a ruling to the contrary, the Court found that there 
was no reason to believe that the exhibit would have been withheld from the jury. The Court 
affirmed the conviction because it had not been demonstrated that the Defendant was in anyway 
prejudice by the absence of the exhibit in the jury room during the jury's deliberations. 
Counsel for Laura Miller immediately indicated to the Court that the exhibit taken from 
the courtroom by the Prosecutor was a key exhibit for the defense. The prosecution was at fault 
and the reasons the jury did not received the Exhibit as set forth above in the Statement of Facts 
to this brief, is the relevant portion of the Defendant's closing argument in which Exhibit One was 
referred to as a key exhibit which should be read by the jury because it contained statement which 
were inconsistence to the statements of Mr. Guhr and other persons during trial. The jury never 
was able to review the outrageously inconsistent statements of Mr. Guhr in the letter. 
The Prosecutor was the party that took the exhibits out of the courtroom and it was the 
cause of the exhibit not being avaiabile for the jury during deliberations. The Defendant submits 
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that the Court should have granted the Motion for Mistrial which was timely made by the 
Defendant. The Defendant has shown that the exhibit was an important material exhibit and its 
absence prejudiced the Defendant and denied her the right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the District Court erred in failing to suppress all 
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant and the fruit of that illegal search. Even if the evidence 
from the warrant obtained form the unreliable confidential informant is not excised, the search 
warrant cannot support a finding of probable cause because the myriad of material 
misrepresentation recklessly included in the warrant and the numerous errors and omissions. 
A new trial should be ordered if the Court reverses the denial of the Motion to Suppress. 
In addition, the Defendant has raised in Point HI grounds for a new trial based upon the taking of 
an exhibit from the courtroom during deliberations by the prosecutor. This is separate ground 
which the Defendant requests that the Court reverse the conviction and order an new trial. 
DATED this day of September, 1994. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK O* THE COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UfAB c70™ 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. 
LAURA RUTH MILLER, * 
DOB: 3-5-61, 
PO. BOX 96, LA SAL, UT. 84530 
Defendant. * 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 9317-;?7J 
•Officer: WILLIAM PIERCE, BILL KING, 
The undersigned Complainant, CRAIG C. HALLS, under oath 
states on information and belief that the Defendant(s) committed in 
the above named County, the Crime(s) of: 
COUNT No. 1: 
UNLAWFULLY PRODUCING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE: A 
Felony of the 3rd degree, in violation of Section 
58-37-8 (1) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended in the manner as follows: That the said 
defendant on or about the 1ST day of OCTOBER, 1993, 
did knowingly and intentionally produce a controlled 
substance, to wit: MARIJUANA 
COUNT No. 2: 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE: A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR, in violation of Section 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
the manner as follows: That the said defendant on 
or about the 1ST day of OCTROBER, 1993, did 
knowingly and intentionally have in her possession a 
controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana. 
COUNT No. 3: 
POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA: A Class B Misdemeanor, 
in violation of Section 58-37a-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended in the manner as follows: 
That the said defendant on or about the 1st day of 
OCTOBER, 1993, did have in her possession 
paraphernalia used to plant, propagate, cultivate, 
grow, manufacture, produce, process, prepare, store, 
inhale, ingest, or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body. 
Contrary to the form of the Statute in such case made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
g C. Halls 
Juan County Attorney 
DATED: October 4, 1993 
."SEVENTH DISTRICT COUP-
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * FINDING OF FACT 
AND ORDER 
vs. 
LAURA MILLER, * Criminal No. 9317-273 
Defendant(s). * 
This matter came on before the Court on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress on the 4th day of February, 1994. Defendant was present 
and represented by counsel, Randall Gaither. The State was present 
and represented by Craig C. Halls. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the search was conducted pursuant to 
a warrant and that the Defendant has the burden of going forward 
and showing that the warrant was deficient. 
2. Having heard all of the witnesses in this case the Court 
finds that the information given to the Officer in this case was: 
a. That the confidential informant lived at the 
residence immediately before the information was given. 
b. That the Officer had in his possession pictures of 
what he believed to be Marijuana plants described as being 
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located on the property. 
c. That the informant had been a caretaker of this 
property and was allowed to remain on the properties even 
after difficulties had arisen with other persons who had 
lived or been trusted there. 
d. That the description of the premises given 
by the informant was borne out through independent 
investigation by the Officer. 
e. That the Officer viewed the properties at the 
location where the informant had said the plants were 
being cultivated from a public access and verified that 
the description was similar to what had been expressed to 
him earlier. 
3. The Court finds that the seeming inconsistency in the 
search warrant with regard to the amount of time that the Officer 
had known the confidential informant was apparently in error based 
upon the testimonyf but that this error was not reckless and was 
not material and did not change the sufficiency in the warrant. 
4. The Court finds that no other part of the warrant was 
reckless and that information with regard to the confidential 
informant relationship to the people on the property and possible 
motive was not borne out by the evidence and was not of a 
substantial enough nature to change the sufficiency of the warrant 
and was not required to be expressed in the warrant to make the 
warrant sufficient. 
5. The Court finds that after these supposed incidents 
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occurred which bias the confidential informant, that the owner of 
the property retained him as a care taker of the property. 
6. The Court further finds upon hearing the testimony of the 
owner of the property and the defendant that their testimony was 
not as reliable as evidence placed into the record by the Officer. 
7. The Court finds that warrant was sufficient, that the 
information express in the warrant provided probable cause to 
believe that marijuana plants may have been cultivated on the 
property at the time in question. That this was sufficiently set 
forth by the warrant and that the warrant was sufficient. 
IT IS THEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this ^TK day of March, 1994. 
Judcje Lyle R. Anderson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Randall Gaither, at 
321 South 600 E., S.L.C. Ut. 84102 this £\J* day of March, 1994, 
by placing same postage prepaid in the Monticello Post Office. 
~~
I/
 Julie T 
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IN THE JUSTICE COURT '-j/l'-
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of SAN JUAN ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE; Justice Court Judge Muhlestein, Monticello, Utah 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
William Pierce 
That he has reason to believe that on the premises of : 
The mobile home and house, outbuildings, vehicles, located on 
the following described pxoperty. (Copy of Warranty Deed also 
attached.) 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft S 0 deg. 16f W and 417.42 ft S 86 deg. 
53'W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M, and running 
thence S 0 deg. 16' W 208.71 ft, thence S 86 deg. 53* W 208.71 ft, 
thence N 0 deg. 16f W 208.71 ft, thence N 86 deg. 53f E 208.71 ft 
to the pob. 
Beg. at a point 32.0 ft. S 0 deg. 161 -W and 626.13 ft. S. 86 
deg 53' W of the NE corner of Sec. 9, T29S, R24E, SLB&M., and 
running thence S. 0 deg 16' W 208.71 ft., thence N. 86 deg. 53' E. 
208.71 ft. to the pob. 
Commonly known as the Steven Robert Schultz property. 
and/or in the vehicle(s) described as: 
Black two tone Chev. Pickup, unknown Missouri plates, 
and Light blue 1985 Ford pickup, Utah lie. No. 925ZBE 
and a blue and white 1976 Ford Pickup, Lie No. 8437 CV 
In the San Juan County, State of Utah there is now certain property 
or evidence described as: 
Cultivation of Marijuana and other controlled substances. 
and that said property or evidence which consists of an item or 
constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to 
the illegal conduct; 
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Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Cultivation of Marijuana and possession 
of controlled substances. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
Information obtained from confidential informant indicates that the 
property described is being used to cultivate,, marijuana> The 
confidential informant also indicates that marijuana ancT other 
controlled substances are kept in the vehicles and buildings on the 
property. Confidential informant states that he has observed 
controlled substances in possession of one Laura Miller over the 
last few months, in her possession, in the structures (there are 
out buildings, a house and mobile home on the property), and in the 
vehicles she has access to on the property. 
Confidential informant indicated he had viewed the use of marijuana 
and "crack" on the property over the last few months by Miller and 
two unknown males from Moab, Ut. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because; 
Confidential informant is known to the requesting officer for two 
years and has known to be a reliable and truthful individual. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
The confidential informant indicated specific location on the 
property were the marijuana is being cultivated. He described the 
position relative to the building and trees. He provided 
photographs of the live marijuana plants. Through plain view of 
the property from a public access road the location can be seen and 
his description verified. Although only the tall grass can be seen 
as described and seen in the provided photographs. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered, or for other good reasons, to wit: can be 
easily destroyed 
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AFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 1st day of October, 1993. 
JUDGE I' 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT, 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
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